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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to explore broadsheet newspaper framing
and agenda‑setting of two events using the five‑frame model developed by Semetko
and Valkenburg (2000). This article provides insight into how the leading broadsheet
newspaper within BiH’s Republika Srpska frames relationships between the three main
ethnic groups and is the first such study to occur in BiH. By identifying and exploring
the most common frames in Glas Srpske during the five‑year period (from 31 December
2015 to 30 December 2020), the research is meant to answer the following research
questions: How does Glas Srpske frame the conversation about it and portray the Day
of Republika Srpska (RS) and Referendum of the RS Day? The results, which find Attribution of Responsibility and Conflict frames to be the more prevalent in Glas Srpske,
illustrate contentious politics that reinforce differences between ethnic groups in BiH.
These events and the controversial narrative surrounding them are relevant more than
ever in the light of the recent non‑paper ‘Western Balkans – A Way Forward’.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, framing, agenda‑setting, Day of Republika
Srpska, RS Day referendum, Glas Srpske, non‑paper

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to explore broadsheet newspaper framing of two
events using the five‑frame model originally developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). This provides insight into how the main broadsheet newspaper
within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two Entities frames relationships between
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the three main ethnic groups1 in the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is
comprised of two Entities: Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Federation of BiH or FBiH). Along with the two Entities, the
country also has an autonomous self‑governing administrative unit under the
sovereignty of the state of BiH: the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Brčko District). The focus of this article is within RS and the main broadsheet
newspaper, Glas Srpske (‘Voice of Srpska’). The research findings are then couched
within the leaked ‘non‑paper’ (Cirman – Vuković 2021) of April 2021 – allegedly
written by the prime minister of Slovenia – that caused a firestorm across BiH and
the wider Western Balkan region, as it suggested the dissolution of BiH as well as
major reorganisation of other countries in the Western Balkans along ethnic lines.
In order to understand RS, we must first understand the environment in
which it arose. BiH was one of six constituent republics that comprised the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia), which was a one
‑party, socialist federal state. BiH held its first democratic multi‑party election in
December 1990 while still part of SFR Yugoslavia; the overwhelming majority of
votes were cast for the main ethnic‑nationalist parties: the Croatian Democratic
Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ‑BiH; Croat), the Party of Democratic
Action (SDA; Bosniak) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS; Serb). On 14
October 1991, the SDS deputies left the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
due to a plan to vote on Bosnian‑Herzegovinian legislative sovereignty within
Yugoslavia (but not independence). After the SDS departure from the Assembly
of BiH, HDZ‑BiH and SDA deputies voted in favour of legislative sovereignty.
Several days later, the SDS proclaimed a Serb National Assembly, located in
Banja Luka (Malcolm 2002: 228).
On 9 January 1992, the Serb National Assembly declared the creation of
the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be
an integral part of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). The Serb National Assembly
adopted a ‘Declaration to Proclaim the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’, which would cover the areas of ‘Serb autonomous regions
and areas, and other Serb ethnic units in BiH’ (Venice Commission 2013: 5).
The name was changed to ‘Republika Srpska’ in August 1992 (Cigar – Williams
2002). The day after the Serb National Assembly adopted its constitution,
BiH held a two‑day vote (29 February – 1 March 1992) on independence from
Yugoslavia.2 BiH declared its independence in March 1992 and the European
Community recognised its independence on 6 April 1992. The same day, the
Siege of Sarajevo began, and the war had started.
1

Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

2 The referendum asked: “Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia‑Herzegovina, a state
of equal citizens and nations of Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and others who live in it?” Out of the 63.6%
constituents who cast their vote, 99.7% voted for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many
Bosnian‑Serbs boycotted the referendum (Bjö drkdahl 2018).

676

Framing and Agenda Setting of the Day of Republika Srpska…

Nađa Beglerović and Matthew T. Becker

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, better
known as the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), brought the three and a half
year Bosnian War to an end. It established the current consociational (Lijphart
1977) ethnic power‑sharing arrangement as well as the de‑facto partition of
BiH (Malcolm 2002: 270) between the Bosnian‑Serbs and the Bosniaks/Croats
through the creation of two Entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation of
BiH. Maksic (2009) argues that the 1995 DPA transformed BiH into ‘a weak
union of two deeply autonomous ethno‑territories’ (p. 4), which ‘legalized
and legitimized’ (Björkdahl 2018: 38) Republika Srpska.3 According to Toal
(2013), the peace accords ‘institutionalized an ethno‑territorial division of BiH
organized around war territories, locking nationalist antagonism into the very
structure of the state’ (p. 199). Although it institutionalised ethnic division, it
also promoted the return of refugees and displaced persons to their pre‑war
homes, through Annex VII.

Literature Review
Mass media has four main roles in a democratic society (Voltmer 2006): (1)
inform the citizenry; (2) put forth issues of debate; (3) serve as a ‘watchdog’
against the government; and (4) vox populi. In the American context, Cook
(1998) refers to the news media as the fourth branch of government. For societies in transition, the importance of the ‘watchdog’ role cannot be overstated;
according to Voltmer (2006: 5), this is because one of the main tasks of democratisation is to establish mechanisms that hold political elites accountable, and
thus responsive, to the citizenry.
The theory of media dependency states that for societies in transition or
facing instability, citizens are more reliant on mass media for information, and
as such are more susceptible to their effects (Loveless 2008: 162). Individual
citizens of the mass public ‘…can become dependent on a particular medium
for their information and that people dependent on different media tend to have
different pictures of the world’ (Loveless 2008: 166). Schmitt‑Beck (1999: 222),
argues that what the mass media ‘…tell us about the “world outside” becomes
the foundation of the “pictures in our heads” – the beliefs and opinions, for
example, upon which we act…’. When citizens become reliant on a particular
medium and source for their information, they tend to have different views of
the political world.
McCombs and Shaw (1972) argue that the mass media plays an important
role in public opinion formation – in what the authors call the ‘agenda‑setting
function’ of the mass media – as well (p. 176). They state that the audiences not
3 The other entity, the Federation of BiH, was created via the 1994 Washington Agreement, which brought
an end to the Muslim‑Croat War (June 1992 to February 1994; Ramet 2002: 216–217).
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only learn about a given issue, but also how much importance they should attach to said issue; this importance is derived from the amount of information
in a news story and its position on the issue in question. The way in which the
media frames an issue, the amount of time spent covering it and any opinions
(biases) given towards the issue at hand all play an important role in public
opinion formation. Zaller (1996) is a proponent of mass media effects, and
argues that the mass media affects public opinion development on political
events and personalities. For Zaller (1996), mass media influence consists more
in telling people what to think about rather than telling them what to think. The
way an issue is framed has an effect on how individuals perceive and explain
national issues. Nelson et al. (1997) found that the manner in which a news
outlet framed a specific event had an effect on how the news event was perceived
by the public. Similarly, Hall (1997) and Mendelsohn (1993) find that the way
specific events are described, framed and presented is of significance because
the media helps construct an individual’s understanding of specific events. In
the case of referenda framing, Dekavalla (2016) found that Scottish newspapers
framed the 2014 Scottish independence referendum through the lens of policy
and political competition (i.e., elections) rather than the frame of constitutionalism or the right of self‑determination. Noelle‑Neumann (1974) takes media
framing further than the other authors who advocate it; she claims that the
mass media are the creators of public opinion. Other scholars have dismissed
mass media effects in favour of ‘minimal effects’ (e.g., Bennett – Iyengar 2008;
McGuire 1986; Newton 2006).
Regarding newspaper readership in the former SFR Yugoslavia, there was no
true national (pan‑Yugoslav) news media, with the exception of Borba.4 Rather,
the mass media was controlled at the individual republican or provincial level
by the respective republican or provincial communist party. The consequence of
this was that as the decentralisation of SFR Yugoslavia took place (most notably
via the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution), the individual broadsheet newspapers delineated along republican lines – increasingly gearing their news stories toward
their respective republican or provincial audiences (Robinson 1977: 192–199).
According to Ramet (2002), one cannot overemphasise the importance of
the fragmentation of broadsheet newspaper readership along republican and
ethno‑national lines in Bosnia‑Herzegovina (BiH) in contributing to increasing
tensions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. She argues that:
[w]ith Bosnian Croats reading Vjesnik and Večernji list, Bosnian Serbs reading
Politika and Politika ekspres, and Bosnian Muslims reading Oslobodjenje, the
growing divergences in the points of view among the respective media were

4 Borba was the official newspaper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
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very quickly reflected in growing divergences in the perspectives of the three
largest nationality groups of Bosnia‑Herzegovina (Ramet 2002: 41).

Since the end of the war in 1995, BiH has had three main broadsheet newspapers that cater to the three main ethnic communities: Dnevni avaz (Bosniak),
Dnevni list (Croat) and Glas Srpske (Serb). This segmented media market is
conducive to the promotion and continuation of ethnic nationalism. According
to Snyder and Ballentine (1996), the main reason for this is that segmented
media markets incentivise political elites’… to promote nationalist populism as
a substitute for true democratization’ (p. 19). Sivac‑Bryant (2008: 107) concurs,
arguing that nationalist political parties and the mass media continue their
dominance of the public discourse, thus preventing true democratisation and
consolidation to occur. The challenge, according to the USAID ‘Strengthening
Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina Project’ (2013: 1) is that journalists’… adhere to “patriotism” rather than professionalism, and serve mostly
special interests – not the public. The lack of professional and unbiased media
prevents constructive public dialogue and further development of democracy’
in the country. The divisive role of the media is a serious issue that the USAID
has been working on, stating that BiH is facing ‘…an increase in nationalistic
rhetoric in political discourse and the media, which greatly influences public
sentiment and attitudes’ (2013: 1). This biased and ethno‑centric media is not
fulfilling one of the key roles of the mass media for societies in transition: the
‘watchdog’ role (Voltmer 2006: 5), which is supposed to hold all political elites
accountable to the citizenry. In BiH, this may decrease the process of ethnic
reconciliation and even democratisation.
Broadsheet newspapers in BiH present the academic and policy communities
prime ground for discourse analysis due to its segmented media market. According to Boreus and Bergström (2017: 8), ‘discourse analysis is used to study
the ideational aspects of texts.’ Media discourse analysis in this fragmented
society allows us to explore possible change of foci or ideological changes over
time via the use of specific key words, which will be explained in the data and
methodology section.

The ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ Holiday and its 2016 Referendum
The Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared on 9
January 1992 by the Serb National Assembly, prior to the start of the Bosnian
War. The date also coincides with St. Stephen’s Day, which is an Orthodox Christian holiday. Saint Stephen (in Serbian: Sveti Stefan) is also the patron saint of
Republika Srpska. According to Bishop Jefrem, ‘It is difficult to choose a better
heavenly protector of Republika Srpska than Saint Stephen the Archdeacon,
who preached the truth, suffered for the truth and in the end won’ (Orthodox
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 17 (2021) 4
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Times 2021). Furthermore, Stanić (2019) argues that Serbs bear a very close
resemblance to Saint Stephen by stating: ‘Like this saint, our people have been
accused of many things, many false witnesses have testified against us’ (Kulaga –
Momic 2020: 2–3). Lastly, Milorad Dodik, who is the current Serb member of
BiH’s tripartite presidency (and former President of Republika Srpska) stresses
the right of RS to celebrate its holidays while describing RS as ‘a Christian
country and the country of the Serbian people where all other peoples can live
as well’ (Agencija 2020: 2). Thus, the date appears only to have symbolism related to the Serbs and Serbian Orthodox traditions, which ultimately reflects
a Serb‑centric view of the entity and potential desire for statehood. Apart from
the symbolism, the date seemed to have a practical purpose as well. According
to Biserko (2006), Radovan Karadžić5 stated:
We hurried to declare a republic on January 9 because of the possibility that the
European Community would declare the independence of BiH on January 10. In
order for that manipulation not to take place, we had to react immediately. After
the recognition, any of our political actions would have a much smaller practical
effect, and the Serbs in Bosnia would have found themselves in a very difficult
situation (…) We have opened the process of democratic transformation into
a three‑in‑one community, a republic of three peoples or three republics. Each
of these communities establishes sovereignty for itself, and that sovereignty
does not extend to another national community (Politika 12 January 1992).

The celebration of RS Day on January 9 is part of a larger discussion dating
back to 2004 and pertaining to the equal representation and inclusivity of all
three constitutive peoples in BiH with respect to the BIH Constitution (i.e., in
relation to the ‘Law on the Family Patron‑Saints’ Days and Church Holidays of
RS’. In 2007, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted the Act on
the Holiday of Republika Srpska and recognised January 9 as the Day of Republika Srpska. In 2013, then‑Bosniak member of BiH’s tripartite presidency,
Bakir Izetbegović, submitted an appeal (case U–3/13) to the BiH Constitutional
Court regarding the constitutionality of Article 3 (b) of the ‘Law on Holidays
of Republika Srpska’ according to which the Day of Republika Srpska is an official holiday in RS.
In April 2015, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted a ‘Declaration about the RS Law on Holidays’, stating that it would disregard the pending
decision of the BiH Constitutional Court if it was not in line with the publicly
expressed RS view. The Declaration further questioned the legitimacy and pres5 Radovan Karadžić was the first President of Republika Srpska and was convicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, March 2016) for war crimes during the Bosnian War,
including genocide.
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ence of foreign judges at the BiH Constitutional Court. Moreover, it asked the
BiH Parliamentary Assembly to Adopt a Law on the BiH Constitutional Court. In
addition, the RS Prime Minister and the RS National Assembly Speaker argued
that if the BIH Constitutional Court annulled the RS Law on Holidays, it would
not be a legal but rather political decision. Therefore, the decision would not be
implemented in RS (OHR Special Report 2016). The BiH Constitutional Court
assessed the constitutionality of the Article in question and consulted with the
Venice Commission whether celebrating the Day of RS on January 9 would cause
discrimination of Bosniaks, Croats and Others residing in RS. On 26 November
2015, the Court ruled by majority vote (5–3) that:
the Article 3 (b) of the Law on Holidays of the Republika Srpska (Službeni
glasnik Republike Srpske No.43/07) is not in conformity with Article I/2 of the
Constitution of BiH and the Article II/4 of the Constitution of BiH in conjunction with Article 1 (1) and Article 2 (a) and (c) of the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and Article 1 of Protocol No.12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedom (Službeni glasnik BiH No.77/16 2016).

The ruling of the BiH Constitutional Court did not dispute the right of RS to
celebrate the Day of Republika Srpska; rather, it objected to the specific date
of January 9, because it was not an acceptable date to all ethnic groups in RS.
The RS National Assembly was given six months (until 25 June 2016) to modify
Article 3(b) of the Law on Holidays of Republika Srpska to fit with the Constitution of BiH and inform the Court about the measures taken to implement the
decision of the Court (Službeni glasnik BiH No.77/16 2016). These modifications
were meant to reflect the identity, culture and traditions of all three constitutive
people of BiH.6
The RS National Assembly submitted an appeal, which was denied on 17
September 2016 (Bassuener – Mujanovic 2017). Ignoring the ruling, the RS
Day Referendum took place in September 2016. Valentin Inzko, the then‑High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that by carrying out the
proposed referendum, RS authorities would later claim precedent had been set
and would in the future hold additional referenda on the status of Republika
Srpska within BiH (OHR Special Report 2016). That is, since what is now RS
was proclaimed on 9 January 1992 (before BiH declared independence from
Yugoslavia), they have the right to have a referendum on outright independence
from BiH. This view was reiterated by Inzko in the 18 May 2017 issue of Glas
Srpske, where he ‘…stressed that the entities do not have the right to secede’
(Glas Srpske, p. 2).
6 Bosniaks (Sunni Muslim), Croats (Roman Catholic) and Serbs (Serbian Orthodox).
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Despite the BiH Constitutional Court’s ruling, Republika Srpska continued
to celebrate its national day on January 9. On 25 September 2016, RS held
a referendum on the view of its citizens towards the Day of Republika Srpska.
The referendum asked its citizens: ‘Do you support that January 9 be observed
and celebrated as the Day of Republika Srpska?’ In the referendum, 680,116
citizens voted out of 1,219,399 citizens who had the right to vote. The turnout
of 55.57 % was enough to declare the referendum valid according to the RS Law
on Referendum and Citizens’ Initiative, which states that over 50 % of registered
citizens must turn out to vote. The result of the referendum was that 99.81 % (or
677,721 registered voters) voted ‘yes’ and only 1,291 voted ‘no’ (Kulaga 2016: 4).
Republika Srpska argued that the referendum was a democratic tool. At the
same time, the FBiH and the international community questioned the referendum’s true purpose – whether it was to ensure that this date was an official RS
holiday or if it was a matter of RS identity, potentially separate from BiH in the
future. The Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jonathan
Moore, stated the referendum was unnecessary as it could not change the original ruling of the BiH Constitutional Court and ‘RS politicians certainly know
what the people think… [and the referendum] is a “waste of money and time’
(Domazet 2016: 5). The total cost of the conduct of the referendum was 1.42
million Bosnian Marks (or approx.726,034.00 Euros).
After the referendum, the RS National Assembly adopted a ‘Law on the Day
of Republika Srpska’, which was created ‘on the basis of confirmed will of the
citizens of RS’ (Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske: No.113/16) due to the referendum results. According to this law, January 9 would be considered a secular
holiday without any religious affiliation. The decision of the BiH Constitutional
Court remains unchanged but the Day of Republika Srpska continues to be
observed and celebrated within RS.

Data and Methodology
After 1995, there exist three main broadsheet newspapers that cater to the
three constituent peoples in BiH: Dnevni avaz (Bosniak), Dnevni list (Croat)
and Glas Srpske (Serb). The Bosnian‑Serb newspaper Glas Srpske is written
in the Serbian language using the Cyrillic alphabet; it is published in Banja
Luka, the administrative capitol of Republika Srpska. As Loveless (2008: 166),
states, individuals ‘…can become dependent on a particular medium for their
information and that people dependent on different media tend to have different pictures of the world’. Glas Srpske was chosen because the authors are
interested in the presentation and portrayal of events from the Bosnian‑Serb
perspective. Specifically, we are interested in the presentation and portrayal
of the ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the ‘RS Day Referendum’ since both
events had taken place in RS. Thus, it will reveal what and how information
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on the RS Day and RS Day Referendum was conveyed to its readers, who are
concentrated in RS.
We use the five/frame model originally developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)7, which has also been used by other scholars in exploring broadsheet newspapers in countries such as Chile (e.g., Gronemeyer – Porath 2017),
France, the Netherlands (e.g., Dirikx – Gelders 2010) and the United States (e.g.,
An and Gower 2009). The five frames of Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) are:
attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, morality and economic
consequences. Attribution of responsibility illustrates an issue or a problem
by attributing responsibility for its cause or solution to either an individual,
group or the government. The Human Interest frame adds ‘a human face or
an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem’ (Semetko – Valkenburg 2000: 95). The Conflict frame stresses the difference between
conflicting parties (i.e., individuals, groups, institutions) to capture audience
attention. The Economic Consequences frame portrays how an issue or event
will economically affect individuals, groups, institutions, regions or even a country. Lastly, the Morality frame places the issue, event or problem in the context
of religious tenets or moral prescriptions (Semetko – Valkenburg 2000). We
therefore present two hypotheses:
H1: ‘Conflict’ and ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ will be the most prevalent
frames in Glas Srpske.
H2: The referendum will be framed as a democratic right of all RS citizens.

The dataset consists of 1,516 newspaper issues and an analysis of 907 identified
articles published during the five‑year period, from 31 December 2015 to 30
December 2020.8 This time frame allowed for baseline measurement of news
reporting preceding and following the celebration of RS Day and the 2016 RS Day
7 The frames were slightly modified to fit the BiH context and topic. Each issue was reviewed and the
specific search terms included: RS Day, Referendum and January 9. Each article was read at least three
times (i.e., the first time to get a general idea about the article, the second time to carefully code it
and the third time, the article was re‑read to determine its overall tone). While Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) model consisted of 20 questions, this research consisted of 24 questions, which measure
the frequency of five frames in stories related to the RS Day and RS Day referendum. The additional
questions were: ‘Does the story suggest that a non‑Serb ethnic individual or a non‑Serb ethnic/other
groups of people in society is/are responsible for the issue’ (attribution of responsibility frame); ‘Does
the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem?’ (human interest
frame); ‘Does the story reflect disagreement between individuals/ethnic groups/entities?’ (conflict
frame); ‘Does the story contain any moral message’ (morality frame); and ‘Is there a mention of the costs/
degree of expense involved?’ (economic consequences frame). The possible answer for each question
was either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and were coded as: yes (1) and no (0).
8 During the 5-year period, Glas Srpske published 1,527 issues; some issues covering multiple days. In total,
the analysis included 99.3 % of published newspaper issues.
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Referendum. The dataset covers all available newspaper issues obtained through
a purchased subscription of Glas Srpske. All issues had the same format; they were
the print issues in PDF format. For each available issue, all articles mentioning
the RS Day and RS referendum were entirely coded, meaning if an article from
the front page continued in an inside page, the latent text was coded as well.
We use SPSS Statistics v.26 to conduct our statistical analyses. In order to
confirm that our data is indeed appropriate to conduct a factor analysis, we
first run a Kaiser‑Meyer‑Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy Test (KMO Test),
which has a range of 0–1. The data has a KMO value of 0.829, which Kaiser (1974:
35) deems ‘meritorious’. We also test for Cronbach’s α, which is an internal
consistency measurement (α = 0.753). Our preliminary tests confirm that a factor analysis is indeed appropriate for the data. With this ‘meritorious’ score,
a principal component analysis was conducted with a coefficient cut‑off of 0.50
on a rotated component matrix (see: Table 1), thus allowing us to learn more
about the underlying structure of the data (Anderson 1963: 137). Using a principal component analysis and having an eigenvalue of one or higher, we find
that eight components (factors) load. Table 1 represents the rotated component
matrix, which estimates the correlations between each of the variables and the
estimated components. It helps us understand what the components represent
(this is explained in the Results section). These eight factors account for a cumulative 54.103% of the variance in the variables. Four subscale items9 did not
surpass the coefficient cut‑off of 0.50; no items double‑loaded in this analysis.
Table 1: Rotated Component Matrix
Items (frames listed in parentheses)
Does the story suggest that some level of RS
gov’t has the ability to alleviate the problem?
(Attribution of Responsibility Frame)
Does the story suggest solution(s) to the
problem/issue? (Attribution of Responsibility
Frame)
Does the story refer to two sides or to more
than two sides of the problem or issue? (Conflict Frame)
Does the story suggest that some level of the
RS government is responsible for the issue/
problem? (NOTE - by responsible it is meant to
be responsible for either causing or solving the
issue) (Attribution of Responsibility Frame)

Factors
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.751

.690

.672

.657

9 (1) Does the story suggest that a non‑Serb ethnic individual or a non‑Serb ethnic/other group of people
in society is responsible for the issue‑problem? (Attribution of Responsibility); (2) Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action? (Attribution of Responsibility); (3) Does the story contain any
moral message? (Morality); and (4) Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not
pursuing a course of action? (Economic Consequences).
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Does the story suggest that some level of F-BiH
government has the ability to alleviate the
problem? (Attribution of Responsibility Frame)
Does the story suggest that some level of the
F-BIH government is responsible for the issue/
problem? (NOTE - by responsible it is meant to
be responsible for either causing it or solving
the issue) (Attribution of Responsibility Frame)
Does the story suggest that the decision of
Constitutional Court is responsible for the the
issue? (Attribution of Responsibility Frame)
Does one party-individual-group-country reproach another? (Conflict Frame)
Does the story reflect disagreement between
Bosnian-Serbs' political individuals/parties?
(Conflict Frame)
Does the story reflect disagreement between
individuals-ethnic groups-entities? (Conflict
Frame)
Does the story provide a human example or
“human face” on the issue? (Human Interest
Frame)
Does the story employ adjectives or personal
vignettes that generate feelings of outrage,
empathy-caring, sympathy, or compassion?
(Human Interest Frame)
Does the story go into the private or personal
lives of the actors? (Human Interest Frame)
Does the story make reference to morality,
God, religion and other religious tenets? (Morality Frame)
Does the story refer to winners and losers?
(Conflict Frame)
Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave according to
democratic principles/rights/tools or mentions
democracy in general? (Morality Frame)
Is there a mention of financial losses or gains
now or in the future? (Economic Consequences
Frame)
Is there a mention of the costs/degree of
expense involved? (Economic Consequences
Frame)
Does the story emphasize how individuals and
groups are affected by the issue/problem? (Human Interest Frame)
Does the story contain visual information that
might generate feelings of outrage, empathycaring, sympathy or compassion? (Human
Interest Frame)

.637

.610

.591
.754
.573

.518

.717

.619

.563
.663
.656

.620

.797

.759

.521

.811

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. All loadings less than 0.50 are suppressed.
Rotation converged in 12 iterations.
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Table 2: Level of Use of Frames in Glas Srpske, per Year

201610

2017

2018

2019

2020

Study Period,
31. 12. 2015 – 30. 12. 2020

Attribution of
Responsibility

Conflict

Human
Interest

Morality

Economic
Consequences

M:

0.31

0.28

0.06

0.15

0.03

SD:

0.463

0.451

0.237

0.362

0.158

M:

0.15

0.22

0.06

0.15

0.01

SD:

0.356

0.412

0.236

0.360

0.098

M:

0.10

0.15

0.09

0.11

0.05

SD:

0.294

0.355

0.280

0.310

0.225

M:

0.13

0.14

0.11

0.09

0.02

SD:

0.336

0.352

0.307

0.294

0.146

M:

0.09

0.16

0.16

0.11

0.04

SD:

0.287

0.367

0.367

0.312

0.198

M:

0.21

0.23

0.08

0.14

0.03

SD:

0.406

0.418

0.266

0.344

0.159

(M=mean score; SD=standard deviation)

Results10
The framing items that comprise the first and second principal components
confirm our hypotheses due to them consisting of either ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ or ‘Conflict’ subscale items, although one ‘Conflict’ subscale item
loads on the fourth factor with a ‘Morality’ subscale item. The eight factors from
Table 1 present a potential issue since several ‘Human Interest’ and ‘Economic
Consequences’ subscale items load on independent factors, thus extending from
the baseline five of Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) to our present eight. All
eight factors (Table 1) have strong loadings. However, three of our eight factors
consist of single subscale items from either the Human Interest, Morality or
Economic Consequences frames. We therefore keep the original five frames ‘as
is’ in our frame analyses, of course excluding the four subscale items that did
not load in the matrix (see footnote 9 for the non‑loading items).
10 Includes 31 December 2015 issue.
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The most common frame within Glas Srpske that mentioned our key words
for the period 31 December 2015 through 30 December 2020 was the ‘Conflict’
frame (mean: 0.23); the second most common frame was ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ (0.21); third was ‘Morality’ (0.14); fourth was ‘Human Interest’ (0.08)
and fifth was ‘Economic Consequences’ (0.03). When broken down by year, the
‘Conflict’ frame is still the most prevalent, with the exception of 2016, where
‘Attribution of Responsibility’ is more prevalent. Hypothesis 1, which states:
‘“Conflict” and “Attribution of Responsibility” will be the most prevalent frames
in Glas Srpske’ may be accepted. Not only did the research show that the usage
of these two frames in Glas Srpske stressed the differences of opinions and views
regarding these two events, but it also fits with other research and literature,
which show that ‘Conflict’ and ‘Attribution of Responsibilities’ are commonly
used in the news (e.g., Semetko – Valkenburg 2000: 95), but not always simultaneously as it was in our case. See Table 2 for full breakdown by year.
However, in the context of BiH and its complex interethnic relations, these two
frames appear to describe its contentious politics. In terms of ‘Attribution of
Responsibility’, they are presented differently between Republika Srpska and
Federation of BiH. In particular, the news portrayed RS as the one responsible
for solving the problem while the Federation of BiH is portrayed as causing the
problem, which means that the FBiH could alleviate the problem as well (the
high mean score for ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ in 2016 and subsequent drop
may reflect pre/post referendum foci). Although the Federation of BiH is framed
in such a way, the FBiH is typically used as a stand‑in for the Bosniaks – that is,
the FBiH as a legal political entity is not wholly to blame, but rather Bosniaks as
an ethnic group are to blame. An example of this may be seen via the title and
subsequent article published in Glas Srpske on 31 December 2016. The article
title mentions the Federation of BiH, whereas the article itself (first sentence
provided below) solely blames Bosniaks.
Title:
Provokacije iz FBiH povodom Dana Republike
[‘Provocation from FBiH Regarding the Day of the Republic’]
‘Bosniak associations again sent provocative messages to Banja Luka stating
that the verdicts handed down at The Hague Tribunal and the Court of BiH indicate that the RS was institutionally and systematically behind the genocide.
The letter, signed by 29 Bosniak associations, arrived on Friday at the address
of the Mayor of Banja Luka, Igor Radojičić, and a member of the City Assembly.’
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When it comes to conflict, the research further confirmed that individuals
and groups reproached each other reflecting disagreements between political
figures, political parties and ethnic groups. It is important to state that one of the
additional questions added to Semetko and Valkenburg’s model was ‘Does the
story reflect disagreement between Bosnian‑Serb political individuals/political
parties?’ The reason for adding this question was that we wanted to see whether
Glas Srpske illustrated a united front between Bosnian‑Serbs and political parties regarding the Day of Republika Srpska and the RS Day Referendum. The
findings show that there have been disagreements with Bosnian‑Serb political
parties. While the major Bosnian‑Serb political parties (i.e., the Serbian Democratic Party, SDS; and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD)
supported these two events, they disagreed regarding the date on which date
the referendum should take the place. The SDS advocated for the referendum to
take place after the election, questioning whether the referendum was used as
an election campaign by the SNSD since the referendum was scheduled seven
days prior to the 2016 BiH elections, held on 2 October 2016.
Previous studies in the United States (e.g., Neuman et al. 1992; Graber
1993) identified that the economic consequences frame is one of the more
common frames in the news, as it explains the effect specific events or issues
have financially on an individual, group, country, etc. However, our research
revealed that this was the least common frame, meaning that the news did not
stress the financial cost or burden that these two events would potentially have
on RS. Interestingly, the cost associated with holding the referendum was only
mentioned twice (1.42 million Bosnian Marks) while the cost for one of the Day
of Republika Srpska was barely mentioned and was reported to be 498,280.00
Bosnian Marks in 2018 (Glas Srpske 28 May 2018). The majority of the articles
related to the ‘Economic Consequences’ frame discussed the cost related to
building and infrastructure projects, which would be named ‘January 9’ or
an initiative started by Milorad Dodik asking local communities to name one
street or a town square ‘January 9’. In general, Glas Srpske reflects no particular
interest in economic consequences, loss or profit brought about with these two
events. This shows that the emphasis is on discursively maximising emotional
salience to the date or mobilisation of affect as opposed to deliberative calculations. Simply put, national pride – in this instance, Serb national pride tied to
Republika Srpska via January 9 – does not have a price tag (and nor should it).
This emotional attachment to January 9 is therefore tied to Serb identity within
RS. Outside of RS, the referendum was described by the Head of the OSCE
Mission to BiH, Jonathan Moore, as a waste of money, a distraction from real
problems and used to boost the popularity of certain Bosnian‑Serb politicians
ahead of local elections (the referendum was held seven days prior to the 2016
elections) (Domazet 2016: 5). The views of the international community in BiH
tend to have the opposite affect and are used by Bosnian‑Serb politicians in RS
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to show how they are ‘under siege’ by outside forces and must resist. This therefore increases an emotional attachment to the RS and celebrating January 9.
We now turn to our second hypothesis, which states: ‘The referendum will
be framed as a democratic right of all RS citizens.’ This is measured via the following ‘Morality’ subscale item: ‘Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave according to democratic principles/rights/tools or
mentions democracy in general?’ This subscale item has a coefficient of 0.620,
per our principle component analysis (Table 1). The overall mean score is 0.11,
with the highest mean score in 2016 (0.17) and the lowest in 2019 (0.03); see
Table 3 for the full results. On the surface, this seems logical given that the
referendum was held on 25 September 2016 and news coverage would taper
off in later years. However, Hypothesis 2 must be rejected on the basis of such
low yearly scores. This finding is also in line with that of Dekavalla (2016), in
which she found that Scottish newspapers did not frame the 2014 independence
referendum as a democratic right (the right of self‑determination). In our case,
the legality of the extra‑legal referendum as a ‘democratic right” is not at the
heart of the matter within the pages of Glas Srpske; rather, the mobilisation of
affect is the heart of discursive structure. The statistical results of this content
analysis shows the discursive focus of Glas Srpske is ‘who is to blame’ (the moral
‘Us’ vs. the profane ‘Other’) rather than specific foci on ‘democratic rights’ of
the (Bosnian‑Serb) citizenry in Republika Srpska. Although this is the case, the
record shows 55.57% of registered voters in RS turned out to vote, with 99.81
voting in favour of the January 9 holiday (Glas Srpske 2016).11
Table 3: Framing of Democratic Rights in Glas Srpske, per Year.
Referendum as a Democratic Right of RS Citizens
year

mean score

standard deviation

201611

0.17

0,380

2017

0.08

0,276

2018

0,06

0,235

2019

0,03

0,159

2020

0,05

0,159

Study period 31. 12. 2015 – 30. 12. 2020

0,11

0,315

The strength of this study is that it attempts to analyse in depth the contentious
issues as they are portrayed through the main Bosnian‑Serb newspaper. A limitation of this study is that the analysis explores one of the three main broadsheet
newspapers in BiH. The research would contribute to the political science sub11 Includes 31 December 2015 issue.
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field of political communication as the research on framing and agenda setting
of news coverage in BiH regarding national holidays and referendums is to our
knowledge, non‑existent. It also shows the lack of focus on ‘democratic rights’
and more on aspects of ‘who to blame’.

Concluding remarks
The leaked ‘non‑paper’ of April 2021, entitled ‘Western Balkans – A Way Forward’ was allegedly written by Slovene Prime Minister Janez Janša (Slovenian
Democratic Party). It was leaked by the Slovene news portal necenzurirano.si
on 15 April 2021 (Cirman – Vuković 2021) as our research project came to an
end. The authenticity of this ‘non‑paper’ has not been acknowledged, but nevertheless caused a firestorm across the wider Western Balkan region due to its
proposal of partition along ethnic lines to solve the various ‘national questions’
of the former Yugoslavia, such as joining a larger part of Republika Srpska with
Serbia, either uniting Bosnian‑Croat areas with Croatia or providing those areas
special status within BiH, and uniting Kosovo with Albania.12 This thus breaks
with not only the Dayton Peace Accords, but also the international concept of
Uti possidetis, ita possidetis (e.g., Ramet 2002: 210). Section 2.d of the non‑paper
states that ‘Bosniaks will thus gain an independently functioning state and assume full responsibility for it’, however; this is simply a re‑hashing of the failed
1993 Vance‑Owen Peace Plan, which sparked conflict between Bosniaks and
Bosnian‑Croats in Herzegovina. After the non‑paper ‘Western Balkans – A Way
Forward’ became available, Komšić claimed as much, stating:
They offer an option that was offered to us even before the war started, and it
was offered again during the war; basically the option of a small Bosniak state –
or, as they say, ‘Muslim.’ This paper, this kind of politics, everything that gives
birth to those ideas prevails in certain European countries, and deep down, it
is fuelled by anti‑Islamism and anti‑Semitism… (cited in Dragojlović 2021).

12 This was only the most recent ‘non‑paper’ that caused controversy in the region. Before the leak,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, Gordan Grlic Radman, submitted a non‑paper about BiH to
EU‑members on March 22, 2021 (RTL, April 19, 2021). The non‑paper focused on key reforms, including the reform of the electoral law. Željko Komšić, the Croat member of BiH’s tripartite presidency,
responded through his own non‑paper, in which he warned about direct influences and interference
of neighbouring countries (i.e., Croatia and Serbia) as well as Russia, and ‘systematic destruction of the
state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and obstruction of their functioning through the officials
appointed by HDZ and SNSD, through the House of Peoples and the Council of Ministers’ (Klix, April 2,
2021). Moreover, Komšić also pointed out how the EU Mission in BiH had shown ‘the level of servitude
towards the demands coming from SNSD (Dodik) and HDZ BiH (Čović)’ by trying to accommodate their
demands, which are ‘not in line with the strengthening of the state institutions or making decisions for
the benefit of all citizens of BiH’ (Klix, April 2, 2016).
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The author(s) of these type of non‑papers need to understand that they promote ethno‑religious nationalism and ethnic exclusivism, and are contrary to
BiH’s best interest in keeping the post‑Dayton peace. To some extent, the non
‑paper resembles Karadžić’s statement regarding the creation of the precursor of
Republika Srpska, the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As may be seen from our analysis of Glas Srpske, the ‘Conflict’ frame is already
prevalent, which shows that there is a lack of consensus and cooperation among
certain political elites representing the constituent peoples of BiH. The focus
needs to be on building these relationships for the best interest of BiH, not
giving an opportunity to those already wanting to secede taking a piece of BiH
with them. The assumption that everyone should be satisfied by having their
own ethnically homogeneous state at the expense of the historically multi
‑ethnic BiH can lead to its downfall and result in further conflicts. It is crucial
that the international community – especially the United States and European
Union – not tolerate ethno‑national secessionist rhetoric, whose end goal is
the disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus, as mentioned previously,
violates the Dayton Peace Accords and Uti possidetis, ita possidetis. BiH cannot
become another ‘lessons learned’ (again) for the international community.
Further analysis of this ‘non‑paper’ is beyond the scope of this present article,
but deserved to be commented on.
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